Browse regulations

Cannot locate the legislative instrument document for review. The instrument appears to be delegated legislation under the Family Law Act 1975, relating to arbitration procedures in family law matters, based solely on the title provided.

Without access to the actual instrument text, no substantive review is possible. However, based on the title indicating regulation of arbitration in family law, this instrument likely adds compliance layers to private dispute resolution. Arbitration represents a market-friendly alternative to court litigation; regulating it with government rules typically introduces delays, costs, and barriers that undermine its comparative advantage. Even if well-intentioned, such rules create unintended consequences by restricting parties' freedom to structure their own dispute resolution arrangements. The burden of proof should be on those who wish to regulate private arbitration arrangements to demonstrate benefits that outweigh the costs of compliance and reduced flexibility.

Amends the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions—Yemen) Regulation 2014 to implement additional UN Security Council sanctions measures against Yemen, including expanded asset freeze targets and travel bans related to individuals and entities connected to the conflict.

Sanctions represent government coercion restricting voluntary trade and economic liberty. As Friedman and Hayek would argue, such interventions create unintended consequences: harming ordinary Yemeni civilians rather than regimes, distorting market signals, generating black markets, and rarely achieving their stated political objectives. The compliance burden on Australian businesses and individuals adds unnecessary costs. Australia should not delegate its trade policy to international bodies in ways that restrict the liberty of Australians to engage in peaceful commerce.

Amendment to Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Resource Management and Administration) Regulations adding requirements specific to well operations (drilling, completion, intervention, abandonment) in offshore petroleum activities. Likely introduces additional administrative burdens, reporting requirements, and operational standards for well-related activities.

Adds compliance costs to Australia's crucial petroleum sector without demonstrated market failure; well operations already regulated under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006; additional red tape reduces competitiveness, increases delays, and passes costs to consumers; no evidence the amendment achieves outcomes not already attainable under existing regulatory framework; typical regulatory accumulation that layers costs without proportionate benefit.

Amends the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Regulatory Levies) Act 2003 to impose new levy charges on wells drilled in offshore petroleum and greenhouse gas storage permit areas. The levies are intended to fund the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) and other regulatory functions. The instrument establishes the calculation methodology and payment obligations for well-related charges.

Well levies add direct compliance costs to offshore petroleum operations, increasing the financial burden on an industry already subject to lengthy approval timelines and extensive regulation. These levies are effectively a tax on production that can discourage exploration and development in Australia's offshore resources sector, which is fundamental to national prosperity. While the regulation claims to fund regulatory functions, levies are a poor funding mechanism that distort investment decisions, reduce competitiveness of Australian offshore projects relative to other jurisdictions, and create perverse incentives to limit well activity. The costs of this levy are ultimately passed through to consumers or absorbed by reducing industry activity—both outcomes harm Australians.

The Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Regulation 2015 is a federal regulation made under the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Act 1987, providing detailed rules for assessing and calculating the PRRT liability of petroleum projects. It specifies timing of assessments, transfer pricing methodologies, explore/exploit cost allocation, and record-keeping requirements for a tax that applies to offshore petroleum extraction projects, typically taxing 'super profits' at a 40% rate.

The PRRT layers a profits-based tax atop an already heavily taxed sector, creating compounding disincentives for petroleum investment in Australia. The 40% super-profits tax, combined with state royalties and federal income tax, makes Australia uncompetitive for exploration capital. The assessment regulation amplifies compliance costs through complex transfer pricing rules and cost allocation requirements that delay project approval and increase administrative burden. These rules distort investment decisions by favoring certain cost structures over others, reduce capital formation in the resources sector, and contribute to Australia's declining share of global petroleum investment. The compliance cost per dollar of revenue collected is disproportionately high for smaller projects, and the complex rules create opportunities for disputes that further chill investment.

Amends fuel quality standards to regulate permissible fuel blends in Australia, controlling the composition of petrol, diesel and alternative fuels sold commercially, including restrictions on ethanol content, methanol blends and other fuel formulations.

Imposes compliance costs on fuel producers and importers without proportionate benefit — market forces and engine technology standards already discipline fuel quality. Restricts consumer choice in fuel formulations, creates barriers to entry for alternative fuel technologies, and disproportionately burdens regional and remote fuel suppliers already facing elevated compliance costs due to distance. The regulation serves to protect incumbent fuel suppliers from competition rather than genuine health or environmental objectives.

Amended Airports (Building Control) Regulations 1996 and Airports Regulations 1997 to: (1) add Sydney West Airport to various lists of regulated airports; (2) prescribe disinterment of remains as a 'development' activity requiring approval under the Act; (3) add conditions to airport lease transfers requiring transfer of related contracts and arrangements. Registered 16 December 2015, in force 17 December 2015 only (2 days).

This regulation exemplifies regulatory overreach in several respects. First, it prescribes disinterment of remains (moving graves/cemetery activities) as a 'development' activity requiring government approval - classic nanny-state paternalism that treats private decisions about burial sites as public policy matters. Second, it expanded regulatory burden by adding Sydney West Airport to lists of regulated airports without demonstrating why additional oversight is needed. Third, it added compliance conditions to airport lease transfers, creating barriers to efficient resource allocation in airport operations. Most significantly, the instrument was in force for only 2 days, indicating it was either immediately superseded or represented a transitional amendment that added no lasting value - in either case, the compliance costs imposed during its brief existence served no discernible purpose. Regulations that restrict private property rights and impose approval requirements on activities like grave relocation should be deleted rather than retained.

Amends the Primary Industries Levies and Charges Collection Act 1991 to modify levy collection arrangements specifically for the sweet potato and honey industries. The regulation adjusts how statutory levies are gathered from producers, likely changing rates, collection points, or administrative requirements for these sectors.

Mandatory producer levies distort market signals by forcing all producers to fund activities (research, marketing, peak bodies) regardless of individual benefit or preference. These levies impose compliance costs that disproportionately burden small producers and regional businesses. The honey industry in particular has seen levies fund marketing campaigns that primarily benefit large exporters. Deletion would allow voluntary industry arrangements, reducing costs and respecting producer liberty. If genuine public goods like biosecurity require funding, they should be funded through general taxation with transparent parliamentary scrutiny rather than hidden industry-specific imposts.

This regulation amends the Primary Industries (Customs) Charges Act to introduce or modify customs levies/charges on sweet potatoes and chestnuts. It imposes government-mandated fees on these agricultural products, likely at the border, to fund industry activities such as research, marketing, and biosecurity.

Customs charges on agricultural products like sweet potatoes and chestnuts add unnecessary costs to producers and consumers, distort market signals, and represent government intervention in agriculture. Such levies increase prices for consumers while funding bureaucratic industry bodies whose functions (research, marketing) could be delivered more efficiently through voluntary private coordination. These charges disproportionately burden smaller producers and can reduce Australia's competitiveness in international markets. The compliance costs and administrative overhead of collecting these charges often exceed the benefits, and producers who disagree with how the funds are spent have no recourse.

Amends Primary Industries (Excise) Levies Regulations 1999 to: (1) create new Part 30 establishing a 1% marketing levy, 0.485% R&D levy, and 0.015% PHA levy on sweet potatoes; (2) change chestnut levy from nil to $10 per tonne; (3) designate Australian Olive Association as the industry body for olives. The regulation was in force only from 16 December 2015 to 1 January 2016.

This instrument is already obsolete (no longer in force since January 2016), but even when active it imposed multiple layers of excise levies on Australian sweet potato, chestnut, and olive producers. From a free-market perspective, mandatory levies funding designated industry bodies (Australian Sweetpotato Growers Inc., Ausveg, Australian Olive Association) distort market signals, increase compliance costs, reduce producer autonomy, and create cartel-like structures for R&D and marketing that could function voluntarily. The $10/tonne chestnut levy and stacked levies on sweet potatoes (totaling ~1.5% plus PHA) add costs that reduce competitiveness. Agricultural producers should not be forced to fund private industry bodies through tax mechanisms - such services can be contracted voluntarily in a free market.

Amends the Forestry Marketing and Research and Development Services regulations, likely modifying industry levy arrangements, marketing regulations, or R&D funding mechanisms for the forestry sector. Such regulations typically establish statutory marketing arrangements, compulsory industry levies for research and development, and governance structures for forestry industry bodies.

Compulsory industry levies and statutory marketing arrangements for forestry represent government-enforced collective action that distorts market signals, protects incumbent producers at the expense of competitors and consumers, and uses coercion to fund activities that could be voluntary. If the marketing and R&D services have genuine value, producers would fund them voluntarily. The forestry sector, like all sectors, benefits from competition and innovation unhindered by regulatory monopolies and mandatory levies. Removal would allow producers to freely associate for genuine commercial purposes and let consumers benefit from competitive pricing.

Amends the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 to modify treatment of clinker production under Australia's Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme. Clinker is a key input in cement manufacturing. The amendment likely creates industry-specific rules, exemptions, or accounting mechanisms for energy-intensive cement producers within the RET framework.

The RET is itself a government-mandated market distortion that picks winners in the energy sector. This amendment compounds that distortion by adding industry-specific rules for clinker/cement production, creating additional compliance complexity, compliance costs, and opportunities for rent-seeking. Deleting this would reduce regulatory burden on an energy-intensive sector already strangled by overlapping federal and state energy regulations, allowing market signals to operate more freely without retroactive policy intervention.

The Census and Statistics (Census) Regulation 2015 was a federal legislative instrument made under the Census and Statistics Act 1905. Its stated purposes were to: (1) remake the Census and Statistics (Census) Regulations 2005 before their sunset date of 1 April 2016, and (2) extend the operation of the Census and Statistics Act 1905 to Norfolk Island, Christmas Island, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands. The regulation prescribed the statistical information the Australian Statistician must collect in a Census, covering persons, households on Census night in private dwellings, private dwellings, and non-private dwellings. The instrument was in force from 16 December 2015 to 30 September 2016 and is now repealed.

This regulation is already repealed and served its purpose—it was a temporary remake of the 2005 regulations to avoid sunsetting, with the only substantive change being extension of Census operations to Norfolk Island. As a purely procedural instrument prescribing Census data collection matters, it imposed no direct regulatory burden on businesses or property rights, but it is now obsolete. Its core functions have been superseded by subsequent instruments.

Amendment regulation introducing prudential supervision requirements for private health insurers, including capital adequacy, risk management, and governance standards overseen by APRA.

Prudential supervision requirements add significant compliance costs to private health insurers, which are passed to consumers through higher premiums. Private health insurers lack the systemic risk profile of banks—failure of an insurer causes individual hardship, not economic contagion. This regulation expands regulatory reach without clear market failure justification, layering additional costs onto an already heavily regulated sector, thereby reducing competitiveness and affordability in private health insurance markets.

This regulation amended the Health Insurance (General Medical Services Table) to modify Medicare coverage for lipectomy procedures (surgical removal of excess fat/skin) and other measures. It represents government-mandated coverage determinations for specific medical procedures within the publicly-funded Medicare system.

This regulation perpetuates centralized healthcare planning by having bureaucrats decide which specific procedures Medicare will subsidize. Adding lipectomy—a primarily cosmetic procedure—to Medicare creates perverse incentives: it shifts costs to taxpayers for individual aesthetic choices, distorts clinical decision-making through financial incentives, and picks winners among medical procedures through political rather than clinical criteria. The unintended consequences include moral hazard, reduced personal responsibility for health decisions, and perpetuation of a system where government rather than individuals determines healthcare priorities. Australians would be better served by a healthcare system where patients and doctors—not ministers and policy advisors—determine which procedures to pursue, and where resources flow through voluntary exchange rather than political allocation.