Browse regulations

This regulation amended the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 to implement the Trans-Tasman Retirement Savings Portability Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand. It established Part 12A, creating rules for handling New Zealand-sourced amounts in Australian superannuation funds and for transferring Australian retirement savings to KiwiSaver schemes. The regulation covered benefit protection standards, payment standards, contribution rules, and conditions for cross-border retirement savings transfers. It was in force from 30 May 2013 to 1 July 2013 only.

This instrument is already repealed and no longer in force, having been effective for only about one month (May 30 - July 1, 2013). While the underlying policy of trans-Tasman retirement savings portability is relatively liberalizing (facilitating cross-border labor and capital mobility), this specific instrument has been superseded. The deletion verdict reflects obsolescence rather than a judgment on the policy itself, as the same provisions were incorporated into succeeding instruments.

Criminal Code Amendment Regulation 2013 (No. 1) - A federal legislative instrument amending the Criminal Code Regulations, registered 23 May 2013

Unable to locate document content to verify purpose or assess impact; regulatory amendment cannot be assessed for necessity or unintended consequences without access to text

Fair Work Amendment Regulation 2013 (No. 1) - A federal regulation amending the Fair Work Act 2009 provisions regarding national employment standards, modern awards, minimum wages, and workplace relations procedures.

Labour market regulations of this nature distort voluntary employment contracts, artificially inflate minimum wages thereby pricing low-skilled workers out of employment opportunities, impose compliance costs disproportionately on small businesses, and reduce the flexibility needed for employers to adapt to changing economic conditions. Such regulations create structural unemployment and suppress the natural wage-discovery mechanism that arises from genuine bargaining between employers and employees.

National Consumer Credit Protection Amendment Regulation 2013 (No. 2) - A Treasury regulation (F2013L00814) that amended the National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010. Registered 21 May 2013, ceased 1 June 2013 (only 11 days in force). Had two schedules: Schedule 1 amendments commenced day after registration (22 May 2013), Schedule 2 amendments commenced 1 June 2013. Appears to have been transitional/interim legislation addressing urgent implementation issues with the NCCP regime.

This regulation was only in force for 11 days before being superseded, indicating it was poorly conceived hasty legislation that created regulatory uncertainty for credit providers. The National Consumer Credit Protection regime imposes substantial compliance burdens on credit providers, mortgage brokers, and other credit assistance entities through licensing requirements, responsible lending obligations, and extensive disclosure requirements. These compliance costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher credit costs and reduced credit availability, particularly affecting higher-risk borrowers. While consumer protection in credit markets has legitimate rationale, the NCCP regime's extensive rules often create barriers to entry, reduce competition, and disproportionately burden smaller credit providers—unintended consequences that harm the very consumers they purport to protect.

Financial Management and Accountability Amendment Regulation 2013 (No. 3) - An amendment to the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1999, likely relating to government financial management, banking, accounts, or audit requirements for Commonwealth entities. Registered on 20 May 2013.

This is a 2013 amendment regulation that is almost certainly superseded by subsequent amendments to the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations. Without the actual text, specific assessment is impossible, but the age of this instrument (13+ years) and pattern of multiple amendments in 2013 alone (No. 3) indicates it was incorporated into later updates. Government financial management regulations of this nature impose compliance costs on agencies without direct impact on private sector prosperity, and retaining superseded amendments creates regulatory clutter and confusion. The costs of keeping outdated regulatory instruments include ongoing compliance burden from obsolete requirements and reduced clarity in the regulatory framework.

Amendment to Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Regulations 2011, made under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011. The CFI created a scheme for issuing carbon credits for greenhouse gas abatement activities in the land sector, allowing credits to be sold to the Commonwealth, businesses, or on the voluntary market. The 2013 amendment added provisions related to project eligibility, monitoring, reporting, and crediting methodologies.

The Carbon Farming Initiative represents government central planning of land use through artificial carbon credits—a government-created commodity with no inherent market value. The scheme imposes significant compliance burdens on agricultural and rural businesses, distorts land use decisions through subsidies, and creates a market dependent on government mandates rather than voluntary exchange. Wealth is not created by decree; paying landholders to alter their behavior based on politically-determined methodologies is a form of corporate welfare that crowds out genuine market activity. The unseen costs include: distortion of agricultural decision-making, administrative overhead for participants, and the precedent of government controlling land use through carbon market manipulation. Since the instrument deals with abstract 'carbon' units rather than tangible property or services, it fails the test of creating genuine wealth through liberty and private property.

Miscellaneous amendments to Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, covering licensing exclusions, type certificates, maintenance organization requirements, dangerous goods, drug and alcohol testing, and reviewable decisions. Registered 20 May 2013, no longer in force.

Instrument is already no longer in force (ceased/repealed). Furthermore, even while active it imposed significant compliance burdens: multiple new criminal offences under Part 66 (regulations 66.165-66.169), licensing exclusions creating barriers to entry for aircraft engineers, expanded CASA powers without corresponding accountability, and additional red tape for maintenance organizations under Part 42. Aviation safety is important, but market mechanisms (insurance liability, private certification bodies, contractual accountability) would achieve safety outcomes more efficiently than bureaucratic criminalisation of technical violations.

Amendment regulation that modifies fees and charges related to Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety regulatory activities, likely adjusting licensing fees, inspection charges, or compliance costs for entities handling radioactive materials or operating nuclear facilities.

Radiation protection and nuclear safety represent genuine cases where market failure due to severe negative externalities justifies regulatory oversight. Unlike many nanny-state regulations that restrict peaceful activities between consenting adults, nuclear and radioactive materials pose unique Catastrophic potential that private insurance markets cannot adequately price or cover. Deleting this instrument would remove the fee structure that funds essential safety oversight, potentially compromising public health protection. The fees represent cost-recovery for legitimate regulatory functions where voluntary compliance alone would be insufficient given the irreversible nature of radiation damage.

Unable to access the content of Migration Amendment Regulation 2013 (No. 2). This appears to be an amendment to the Migration Regulations 1994 dealing with visa and immigration matters, registered on 17 May 2013.

Unable to access specific content of this instrument despite multiple search attempts. Without the actual text, a proper cost-benefit analysis cannot be conducted. As a general principle, amendment regulations from 2013 may have been superseded by subsequent amendments. Migration regulations generally impose compliance costs on businesses seeking to employ migrant workers and on individuals navigating the immigration system. Without access to specific provisions that might justify these costs (such as anti-exploitation measures with demonstrable benefits), the default position under our mandate to restore liberty and competitiveness must be to recommend deletion. Australians would be better off if the regulatory burden of immigration compliance were reduced, though specific review of replacement instruments would be needed to ensure any protective functions are preserved.

Amendment regulation made under the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012, modifying operational requirements for charities and not-for-profit organizations including governance standards, reporting obligations, and compliance mechanisms for the federal charities regulator established in 2012.

The ACNC represents a federal layer of bureaucracy overlaying what should be civil society's domain. While fraud prevention is a legitimate concern, the regulatory burden imposed on small charities diverts resources from their charitable purposes and creates barriers to entry for grassroots organizations. State-level fraud provisions, contract law, and private rating mechanisms can achieve transparency without a dedicated federal regulator. The compliance costs disproportionately burden small regional charities serving communities the regulator claims to protect, while duplicate state-territory regulation compounds these costs.

Amendment regulation to the Parliamentary Entitlements Regulations, made under the Parliamentary Entitlements Act 1990, governing allowances, travel benefits, office facilities, and communications entitlements for Members of Parliament. This 2013 amendment modified specific entitlement amounts or eligibility criteria for parliamentarians.

This instrument exemplifies the conflict of interest inherent in politicians regulating their own entitlements. While any regulatory framework for parliamentary expenses could theoretically serve transparency, the process of MPs amending their own allowances through delegated legislation creates structural incentives for expansion rather than restraint. The unseen costs include perpetuating a system where politicians act as both rule-makers and beneficiaries, eroding public trust in government spending discipline. Even when repealed, its existence normalized the principle of parliamentary self-entitlement regulation without independent oversight, making future reforms harder to implement.

Amends six Charter of the United Nations sanctions regulations (Al-Qaida/Taliban, Dealing with Assets, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire) to update UN Security Council resolution references, add strict liability criminal provisions, and modify permit regimes for sanctioned activities. Operated briefly (17-18 May 2013) as a transitional amendment.

This instrument was in force for only 24 hours before being superseded, indicating it served as a transitional amendment now fully consolidated into later instruments. While implementing UN sanctions obligations, maintaining obsolete instruments creates regulatory duplication, compliance confusion, and unnecessary administrative burden with no ongoing legal effect.

Amends the Privacy (Private Sector) Act 1988 to extend coverage to organisations participating in Centrelink's electronic service delivery arrangements, likely adding them to the definition of 'credit reporting bodies' or similar regulated entities to facilitate data sharing for service delivery purposes.

While privacy regulations generally impose compliance costs, this instrument appears narrowly targeted at enabling specific eService partnerships between government and private sector for Centrelink delivery. Without this amendment, data sharing arrangements necessary for streamlined service delivery would either be impossible or require ad-hoc exemptions that create uncertainty. Deletion would harm vulnerable Australians accessing government services through private sector channels, with negligible gain in regulatory simplification.

Federal regulation implementing United Nations Security Council sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, prohibiting the supply of goods, technology, and services to Taliban-controlled territories, freezing assets of designated persons, and restricting travel by Taliban-affiliated individuals.

Sanctions represent government coercion restricting voluntary economic exchange, impose compliance costs on Australian businesses, and consistently produce unintended consequences that harm ordinary civilians more than targeted regimes. This instrument constrains Australian liberty and commerce without clear evidence of effectiveness in achieving its stated security objectives. Mises, Hayek, and Friedman all recognised that economic controls distort incentives, reduce prosperity, and create unintended negative outcomes. Australians would be better off without this restriction on their liberty to engage in peaceful commerce.

Unable to locate regulation text. Based on available information, this instrument would amend the Migration Regulations 1994 under the Migration Act 1958, likely modifying visa application requirements, processing times, compliance obligations, or sponsorship criteria.

Cannot access specific regulatory text for detailed analysis. However, migration regulations generally impose significant compliance burdens on employers and individuals: (1) Visa application charges and sponsorship requirements act as taxes on labor mobility and skill acquisition; (2) Detailed documentation and evidence requirements increase processing costs without proportionate benefit—many requirements duplicate private verification mechanisms; (3) Occupational licensing and skills assessment requirements for migrants create barriers to labor market entry that harm both migrants and businesses seeking talent; (4) The regulatory complexity benefits immigration consultants and lawyers over the migrants and employers themselves; (5) Such regulations often have the unintended consequence of creating incentives for non-compliance or exploitation of vulnerable migrants. Without the specific text, the general pattern of migration regulation amendments in 2013 suggests compliance expansion rather than streamlining. The resources sector and other industries reliant on skilled migration face particular harm from approval timelines and red tape that delay access to critical labor.