Summary
Regulation establishes a fee schedule for Medicare-reimbursed diagnostic imaging services, specifying item numbers, descriptions, and benefit amounts for the 1998-99 financial year. It bureaucratically defines which imaging procedures are covered and at what rate, creating a rigid, centrally-planned framework for healthcare financing.
Reason
This price-fixing schedule epitomizes the 'fatal conceit' of central planning. By dictating what services are covered and their exact reimbursement rates, it distorts market signals that would otherwise guide resource allocation toward patient-valued services. The regulation stifles innovation—new imaging technologies must navigate bureaucratic addition to the table rather than compete freely. It creates misallocation: overprovision of high-benefit items on the schedule, underprovision of unlisted but valuable services. The unseen costs are enormous: reduced competition among providers, constrained patient choice, and suppressed price competition that would drive quality improvement. In a genuine market, facilities would compete on price, quality, and convenience, expanding access particularly in rural areas where demand is unmet. This regulation replaces organic information flows with bureaucratic guesswork, guaranteeing persistent shortages, surpluses, and inefficiencies—all while adding compliance overhead to practitioners. Repealing it would unleash price competition, diversify service offerings, and align imaging capacity with actual patient preferences rather than political calendar updates.